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SHEPHERD I. FRANZ, GOVT. HOSP. FOR INSANE

HOWARD C. WARREN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (*Review*)

JOHN B. WATSON, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY (*J. of Exp. Psych.*)

JAMES R. ANGELL, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO (*Monographs*) AND

MADISON BENTLEY, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS (*Index*)

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF

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SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY NUMBER

EDITED BY J. H. LEUBA

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THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES

RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

BY JAMES H. LEUBA

Bryn Mawr College

Wells (8, 9, 10, 11) published during the past year several papers of interest both to the psychologist and to the philosopher of religion. "Two Common Fallacies in the Logic of Religion" (8) gave rise to a discussion (2, 7, 11) very briefly summarized here. That paper may claim the merit of providing names for long recognized fallacies. The "pragmatic fallacy," as Wells calls one of them, results from the "confusion between the value and the truth of belief"; the other, the "fallacy of false attribution," consists in ascribing as cause to the religious experience an "outside," higher force, where in reality the cause is "merely physiological—from below." James is singled out as a chief or rather, perhaps, the most conspicuous sinner with respect to both these fallacies.

Wells' critics (2, 7) do not deny the existence of the pragmatic fallacy, but they object to his criterion of truth and of value, and to his understanding of the effect of false metaphysical belief. It would be inappropriate in this journal to follow in detail this discussion; much of it belongs rather to a philosophical periodical. We may say, however, that Brightman's (2) main objection is to the clean cut separation made by Wells between truth and value. He urges that "description of reality is not complete truth until we know the truth about its value; and *vice versa*." "Religion will always be more interested in reality as value than in reality as fact"; but the "philosophy of religion can never rest 'content'

until it finds some consistent way of understanding reality—existence and value—as a whole.”

Moore's criticism (7) is directed mainly against Wells' statement that metaphysical beliefs—whether true or false—cannot lead to objective results either harmful or beneficial, because such beliefs “refer to no empirical objects.” Metaphysical beliefs—true or false—may, on the other hand, possess values—either positive or negative—of a *subjective* sort. This means, for instance, that “to believe in God, even if there be no God, can have no bad indirect, objective effect,” and may be productive of much subjective good. Moore affirms that this distinction between “subjectively valuable” and yet “objectively false” presupposes two false postulates and he adds, “it is perfectly conceivable that false religious beliefs may be comforting and even inspiring—may have both hedonic and moral value—and yet at the same time be positively harmful to the spiritual nature.” On the other hand, pursues Moore, a false “scientific” belief (as, *e.g.*, in the non-reality of pain) may be “subjectively” valuable and yet “objectively” harmful (as in the case of the example, in hindering a cure of the disease which causes the pain). That, Wells does not deny; he claims merely that if such beliefs are to possess a balance of positive value, they must be true. To the first of Moore's criticism Wells retorts that “the ‘spiritual nature,’ in Professor Moore's sense of the term, does not count as a factor of biological significance in the struggle for existence,” and is, therefore, beside the point.

This discussion is of interest to the psychologist of religion chiefly because of the failure on the part of every disputant to differentiate the “scientific” beliefs in gods from those that are metaphysical in the sense in which Wells uses these terms. “Scientific” beliefs refer, he tells us, not to the Whole, but to detail of the physical environment, to discreet facts of experience; whereas “beliefs in transcendental realities of any sort . . . would be called ‘metaphysical.’” Everyone of them assumes that the beliefs in the gods of the various religions are metaphysical beliefs. I hold, on the contrary, that they are “scientific” or, rather, pseudo-scientific beliefs, *i.e.*, inductions from specific, concrete experiences.¹ Conceptions of this sort differ from metaphysical conceptions of God in their origin, nature, and function. The failure to keep these two kinds of Gods separate continues to obscure and make barren many of our discussions about religion.

¹ This I have tried to demonstrate at some length in Chapter XI of my *Psychological Study of Religion*.

The fallacy of false attribution is illustrated by Wells in connection with James's interpretation of mysticism.¹ Brightman (2) remarks that the fallacy of false attribution is a fallacy only from the standpoint of a positivist who rejects all metaphysics, or of a deist who finds the divine only in lawless interventions in the course of nature; but for a theist, or a pantheist, or a religious idealist, say of Lotze's type, there is no such fallacy. For these, any event in the world is capable of being explained from two standpoints; first, the standpoint of its relation to previous events in the temporal series (the phenomenal cause; in, for instance, psycho-biological terms); and the standpoint of its relation to metaphysical reality. In this last case, the mystical state appears as an aspect or activity of the real, or divine. Moore's comments on this point do not differ materially from those of Brightman.

In so far as religion is concerned, the real issue involved is met neither by Wells nor by his critics. That issue can be fairly met only when it is clearly recognized that the god-ideas of the religions are not metaphysical creations, but the outcome of scientific or pseudo-scientific inferences from particular physical or psychical phenomena. An explanation of religious experience in terms of that kind of god, cannot stand together with a psycho-biological explanation: they exclude each other. But whatever "explanation" of religion by means of a metaphysical conception of God may be given, may very well coexist with a psycho-biological account: both may be valid. Wells's practical implication in this and in the "Biological Value of Religious Beliefs" (9), namely that the question of the "truth" of God matters little, since the belief in God cannot do any objective harm and may do much good, loses all cogency if, as we claim, the gods of the religions are not metaphysical conceptions.

An important distinction seems to have escaped Wells' observation. He defines the fallacy of attribution as consisting in the erroneous interpretation of an experience whereby it is attributed to an external, divine source. But some, at least, of the facts he has in mind involve more than a false interpretation; they imply, in addition, an identification of interpreted, mediate experience with the immediate experience itself. The mystic, for instance,

¹ Incidentally, I wish to correct the statement made by Wells that the conclusion of my study of mysticism is that it is "a form of sublimated love." I do not understand how even a superficial reading of my papers in the *Rev. Phil.* and in *Mind* could produce that impression. In these papers, I assign four main roots to Christian mysticism, love is one of them.

is not aware that he interprets; he thinks that he directly experiences God. Now, that is, first of all, not a fallacy of false, but of *unrecognized* attribution. There are, then, two fallacies of attribution involved in the facts which Wells sets before us, that of false and that of unrecognized attribution.¹ They should not be confused. Of these two fallacies, the more significant one seems to me to be the latter.

"The Biological Value of Religious Belief" (9) is a semi-popular paper in which Wells mentions and illustrates the various values of religion—hygienic, ethical, industrial, artistic, etc. It seems to the author that whether true or not, religious beliefs will continue to exist among the masses, "those who predict the 'irreligion of the future' fail to take into account the emotional and temperamental basis of belief." Criticism is made elsewhere of the affirmation, repeated here, that "the question of truth is irrelevant to a discussion of the value of religious belief." The chief weakness of the paper seems to us to be the vagueness with which "religion" and "religious belief" are used, and its failure to balance the dis-values against the values of religion. In this, Wells is merely following a usage established long ago by those defenders of existing religions who will know only of the benefits they confer upon mankind. But is it not profitless at this time to tell us that religion has had and still has positive values? That which we want to discover is whether the particular forms of religion now in existence, when all their effects, immediate and distant, are taken into account show a better balance than other possible forms of religion or, perchance, irreligion.

In the "Religious and Moral Discipline of Children" the same author (10) breaks a lance for the recapitulation theory. That theory possesses, he thinks, "its greatest value when applied to the problem of religious and moral education." In our estimation the truest statement of the article is found on the first page, "the only certain way of learning the best methods of education is that of observation and experimentation." I almost wish the author had stopped there, for the recapitulation theory in its alleged applicability to education is a snare. If it purported to be merely an

¹ In the *Inter. J. of Ethics*, 1904, 14, 323, I have brought out the presence of the fallacies of false and of unrecognized attribution (without naming them so) in James's discussion of mysticism. More recently, in the *Beliefs in God and Immortality*, pp. 150-153, I pointed out the latter fallacy in writings of Professor E. E. Bacon upon immortality. In the *Hibbert Journal*, 15, 611-613, Dr. Charles Mercier mentions some instances of unrecognized attribution in the utterances of Sir Oliver Lodge.

affirmation of the impossibility in which the child is to begin his psychical life at the highest point reached by his parents or the race, it would be an innocuous platitude. If the doctrine affirmed that the child should retrace *all the steps* taken by the race, no more absurd educational guide could be chosen. As a matter of fact, no one defends that form of the theory. The tempered form of it, according to which the child is to retrace only some of the principal stages of the long, devious route over which the race has passed in its upward march, is the only one advocated. But this modified form involves in itself a denial of the pedagogical usefulness of the theory, since it implies the absolute necessity of omitting many of the stages and gives no answer to the all-important question as to which stages should be omitted and which retraced. Shall the child be made to worship animal gods? Through which one of the steps of the sacrificial rites shall he be led: the killing of animals, the offering of the blood, of a substitute for the blood? The recapitulation doctrine can be of no service whatsoever in determining *which* of the racial steps should be used and which should be discarded in the education of the child. Guidance in this matter will have to come from pedagogy and psychology. "The recapitulation theory is as useless for the determination of the succession of beliefs the child should entertain as it is in the determination of the changes of diet he is to undergo."¹

Wright's "Relation of the Psychology of Religion to the Philosophy of Religion" (12) brings us back to the problem of the nature and truth of the god-ideas. Psychology proceeds on the general assumptions of the sciences (the categories of time and space, cause and effect, matter and motion, etc.). Its task is the description of religious phenomena in terms of structures, functions, and modes of behavior of general psychology. It is concerned with religious phenomena "merely as such." Should it be found that psychological laws are not sufficient to account for these phenomena, "theism and spiritism might be regarded as experimentally proved." But if the reverse were true, "the possibility of the existence of such beings in the universe would be unaffected," and philosophy would still have to pronounce on that question. The critical remark we have made above with reference to the gods of the religions and the gods of metaphysics finds application here also. Philosophy, we would say, can not prove the reality of the gods of the religions;

¹ "Children's Conception of God and Religious Education," *Relig. Educ.*, 1917, 12, 12.

that proof can be given by science only. But philosophy may perchance prove the existence of gods of another kind, metaphysical gods. Before the respective provinces and tasks of psychology and philosophy can be correctly separated, the distinction existing between these two classes of gods and its significance must be realized.

Wright does not think that because the psychology should be carefully distinguished from the philosophy of religion, the psychologist should not be also a philosopher and treat philosophical questions. The two kinds of problems may even be discussed profitably in conjunction, provided the two methods and points of view be not confused.

The second half of the article is taken up by a consideration of some of the ways in which the psychology and the philosophy of religion will profit when no longer confused; by an enumeration of some of the problems which each discipline should attempt separately; and by a statement of the author's convictions upon religion.

"Never before in the history of the world, did rational, social values need more the sanction of religion than at present, because never before did they need to come to the consciousness of the individual in intenser form"—in these words Ellwood's paper on "Religion and Social Control" (3) may be introduced. The essential process in religion, is, according to him, the projection of social and personal values into the universe. Thus, values are universalized and made absolute; and, because of that, religion releases fully the energies of the individual in periods of crisis, in particular the energies that make for self-effacement and self-sacrifice. Thus and only thus can be attained the fullest degree of united and coöperative action. This process of projecting values into the universe does for instincts and emotions what the rationalizing processes of the intellect do for knowledge: the first provides a world of universal values, and the second a world of universal ideas; both are equally necessary to social existence.

But, if values must be given a religious sanction, the sanction need not be any particular theological notion; theology passes, but religion endures. The real religious problem is now, as always, "the problem of getting a religion adapted to the requirements of our present social life." It seems to the author that a humanitarian ethics supported by a religion of humanity is the present need of civilization.

If it could be shown that the mystic is not so alienated from

human nature as he seems, that he differs from others in degree, not in kind, a basis would have been laid for a better understanding. This Bennett (1) tries to do as he takes up successfully four characteristics of mystical life: renunciation of thought, passivity, naïve optimism, the apparent emptiness of its knowledge. Bennett finds an analogy to renunciation of thought in the scientific method "that zealously cultivated dispassionateness by which he (the scientist) is to become mere observer and reporter of pure fact." It is in the light of this analogy that the author would interpret the mystic's negations. The emptying of the mind is only a preliminary step: "If God is to be known of man, he must be first worshipped as the God who is unknown." The cultivation of passivity is not something purely negative. It should rather be understood as an effort to get rid of strain in order to act spontaneously, from "nature," as it were. The mystic is trying to become the spontaneous expression of God.

The author is less successful when he attempts to make us see in a favorable light the naïve optimism of the mystics. Still less satisfactory is he with an attempted explanation of "the apparent emptiness of the mystical knowledge." We agree with him that the mystic is "more ecstatic over the *fact* that he has seen, than explicit about *what* he has seen"; he is so impressed by his conviction of the unutterableness of what he has learned that he insists exclusively on the wonderfulness of the revelation. But we thought that the author desired to show that these revelations are not so empty as they seem. That he has not done.

In the strict sense of the word "instinct," there is no specific religious instinct; many of the common instincts and the corresponding emotions are at the root of religious activities. But if one may not speak of the religious instinct, one may speak of the religious *sentiment*, using that term in the sense given it by Shand. From that conception as a starting point, Wright (13) traces briefly the development of religion under three heads: the objects or agencies of the religious sentiment, the values that are sought through these agencies; and the religious sentiment itself. In earliest societies the religious sentiment has but one, and that an ill defined object; the sentiment itself is vague, and the moral values recognized by the group are not necessarily connected with their religion. Gradually the sentiment becomes differentiated and individuated; it splits up into a variety of sentiments, each attaching to a different object. In a third stage, the various "gods" have become more

or less completely synthetized into a higher and more concrete unity, monotheism. This paper is significant as an indication of the spread of psychological science and of the increase of its influence upon the understanding of religion. The author's general conception of the function of religion is that of an instrument serving to the organization and enhancement of moral values, these moral values possessing a validity that is independent of religion.

In the "Primitive and the Modern Conceptions of Immortality," Leuba (4) summarizes what he considers to be the chief contribution of the first part of his recent, book—*The Beliefs in God and Immortality*—namely, that in the western world there are two great historical conceptions of personal immortality, differing in their origin, their nature, and their function. These two conceptions have never before been clearly and adequately differentiated.

In "Ecstatic Intoxication," the same author (5) seeks to account for the remarkable fact that in all or nearly all savage and semi-civilized peoples, ecstatic intoxication is regarded as communion or union with the divine. The understanding of that fact is, in the mind of the author, closely connected with the understanding of certain trance-like states, known to the higher religions under the name of mystical states, and regarded as communion or union with God.

Molnar (6) recommends as a new method in religious psychology a more systematic observation of the inner life and the graphic representation of it, together with its comparison with another graph, covering the same period, indicating the "practical attitude" of the subject. The author's main directions concerning the first graph are to observe one's inner state and to grade it between two limits. Altogether nine states are named between these extremes (high moments, communion with God, peace, disquiet, dissent, indifference, backsliding, "fiat," monoideism of sin). The observations are to be plotted every two hours. In the second half of the paper, three curves, representing the religious experiences of three persons, are discussed by way of illustration.

There is no doubt whatsoever that the effort to make graphic representation of individual religious life would greatly help the making of full and precise observations; but the directions given in this paper are of such a nature that little, if any thing, can be expected from curves established according to them.

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THE INSTINCTS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

University of Missouri

Ever since Hobbes, the dominant influence in social theory, next after social conditions themselves, has been theories of human nature, which we may roughly call "psychology." Psychological theories, however, are usually applied in social interpretations somewhat later than their promulgation, and in the meanwhile they may have undergone extensive modifications at the hands of the psychologists themselves. Again, they are often uncritically applied in the social sciences without regard to the complexity of the phenomena which they are used to interpret. This has led some students of society to decry the use of psychology in the social sciences and to demand that these latter rely wholly upon "inductive methods." However, the sociology, economics, and political science of today are still dominated by psychology. They cannot in fact get rid of this domination, and their wiser devotees are trying to see that the psychology used by them is up-to-date.

The above paragraph almost exactly describes what has happened with the psychological theory of instinct in the social sciences. Almost any reflective reader of twenty-five years ago might have discerned a good deal of sociological dynamite in James's chapter on "Instinct" in his *Principles of Psychology*. Nevertheless, "instinct" had no vogue in the social sciences until McDougall published his *Social Psychology* in 1908. Now, however, the literature of the social sciences is swarming with all sorts of appeals to "instinct," most of them uncritical, to explain any phenomena at all obscure. We hear of "creative instinct in industry" and even of "the instinct of thought"!

While the writer of this review was one of the first to urge the proper recognition of an instinctive element in our social life, he feels now that he must warn against the present uncritical use of this concept by many writers, or else a reaction is bound to come which will discredit its use altogether. Accepting "instinct" as the racially hereditary element in behavior, it is obvious that both on account of the nature of man as an organism whose behavior is highly modifiable and of civilization as a complex series of acquired habits, its use in explaining present social conditions must be guarded. The assumption that the mores, institutions, and adult behavior of a civilized group can be explained largely through "instinct" is open to grave doubt. Rather it would seem that the concept is chiefly useful in explaining the origin of human relationships and those constant elements in social behavior which are found in all stages of human culture. Practically all adult human behavior, so far as we know, is an indefinite mixture of instinct, habit, and intelligence; and the same thing is true of human institutions. We say "indefinite" because the proportion of instinctive, habitual, and intelligent elements in any given concrete social situation is practically impossible of determination.

With these principles in mind it may be profitable to examine briefly a few typical appeals to the instincts in the current literature of the social sciences.

In the field of ethics Mr. Folsom (1) would have us interpret morality, both customary and idealistic, in terms of the gregarious complex, which Mr. Trotter calls "herd instinct." He argues that social and moral values are formed upon the basis of the instincts, and his paper is devoted largely to showing how this is done. "Moral ideals and the sentiments of custom, convention, and fashion are conditioned reflexes," he tells us, "built largely upon the original

tendencies of the herd-control complex." The instincts in this complex are "the roots of morality." He does not deny the element of habit or even of intelligence in the "mores." However, it is not habit or intelligence which gives the mores their power but "herd instinct." "Once determined, they are entrenched by instinct almost beyond the possibility of dislodgment." In addition to "herd instinct," instincts of "altruism," of anger and fear, mastery and submission, of aversion, and of self-repression and self-restraint also enter into morality. But "the essence of sin in group morality is breaking the bonds of herd instinct." In spite of this instinctive view of morality, however, Mr. Folsom concludes wisely that the best method of moral education is through knowledge and enlightenment.

But it is in the field of economics that the doctrine of the instincts threatens most to be carried to extremes. This is, of course, a natural reaction from the highly intellectualistic doctrines of the orthodox economists of the nineteenth century. The late Professor Carlton H. Parker read before the meeting of the American Economic Association in 1918 a paper on "Motives in Economic Life" (4) which probably has been the basis of more newspaper editorials than any scientific paper of recent years. Professor Parker combined the doctrine of the instincts with the Freudian doctrine of "balked disposition" to explain labor troubles and revolutionary movements. He listed sixteen instincts (among them the "instinct of thought") which must be satisfied in economic life if there is to be social harmony. Disregarding the effects of propaganda and the mores of the particular group involved, he would explain the I. W. W. movement largely through the fact that the economic conditions under which the wandering laborer works afford no adequate satisfaction to even a majority of the fundamental instincts; and this makes him a social rebel. The paper contains no recognition of the part played by habits, ideas, and standards in revolutionary movements, but would apparently explain them entirely through instinct and the repressive environment of present civilization.

Mr. Tead (6) is a follower of Professor Parker and simply develops his ideas. More cautious than his master, he lists only ten fundamental instincts, and explains that instinct is never uncomplicated by other factors in human behavior. He attempts to show in successive chapters how labor conditions may be such as to satisfy fundamental instincts and thus a balked disposition

avoided. Like Professor Parker, Mr. Tead has a benevolent purpose, and his book will do good, but it is not satisfactory from the standpoint of science.

Mr. Smyth, who is a consulting engineer, is more careful but more vague. He recognizes only four fundamental instincts—to live, to make, to take, and to control, or self-preservation, construction, acquisition, and mastery (5). In addition he recognizes another factor, the desire to know, which he calls, in engineering terms, "the social strain equalizer." All of these must be recognized in social reconstruction, and coördinated by a rational national purpose.

Of a quite different character but still touching upon our subject is Professor Ogburn's paper (3). Professor Ogburn appears as an advocate of the now rather badly discredited doctrine of "the economic interpretation of history." Curiously enough he appeals to the Freudian psychology as a basis for an economic interpretation of the larger social movements. The habitual repression of economic instincts and desires leads them to appear in history in all sorts of disguises—religious, moral, and political—but they are nevertheless the real motives which underlie most social movements. Professor Fetter's criticism in the discussion of the paper is so to the point that it is worth quoting. He turns the tables on the theory by pointing out that Marx's materialistic interpretation of history is itself an example of a biased explanation due to unconscious prejudice. "Marx was a disappointed revolutionist who was championing the cause of labor and was seeking some philosophy that would support his practical agitation against the capitalist class."

It would be difficult to harmonize the many discrepant statements in the above writers. The element of truth in their theories, and perhaps a good antidote to their exaggerations, may be found in the careful statements of Professor Hocking's book (2). He shows that civilization essentially involves a continuous and progressive modification of original human nature—a "remaking" of it in each individual through the agencies of social control. The way in which these agencies of social control do their work in modifying the original nature and in building the character of the individual is what determines chiefly the character of our civilization. Human character is and should be an artificial product. Human instincts, when carefully examined, are found to offer no impediment to the realization of ethical ideals *which are socially sound*. Hence there

is no argument for getting our norms for human living from original human nature, as some of the above writers seem to imply.

Perhaps the above is sufficient evidence that social psychology has at last outgrown the suggestion-imitation stage of its existence!

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CRIME AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY ANGIE KELLOGG

Bryn Mawr College

The criminological journals during the past year have been full of accounts of surveys made of groups of offenders in courts, prisons, reformatories, detention houses and the like. In general, they consist of physical and mental examinations and social investigations. The purpose is to throw light upon delinquents, their physical and mental status and development, their social, economic, and occupational history and conditions; to trace as far as possible the relation between the conditions of their lives and their specific offenses; to point out the characteristics common to each group; to disclose their needs and to indicate at least the main lines of rational treatment. The following notes will be easier to read if we place them under four heads: (1) Statistical studies of delinquent women and girls, (2) Statistical studies of juvenile delinquents, (3) Miscellaneous statistical studies, (4) Non-statistical studies.

I. *Statistical Studies of Delinquent Women and Girls*.—Several studies, concerned particularly with immoral women and girls, tabulate and explain information with respect to physical and mental ages, intelligence quotients, school grades, the relations of physical and mental conditions to industrial efficiency, the use of alcohol and drugs, frequency of arrest, age of first sex offense, age

of entering life of prostitution, venereal disease, relationship of venereal disease to the number of offenses, the number of illegitimate children, the family history, physical, mental, economic and social. Thus, Anderson (1) considers one hundred immoral women as seen in court; Paddon (29) studies fifty feeble-minded prostitutes in the New York Magdalen Home, discussing in particular their emotional natures, the stable and unstable, the erotic, docile, obedient, easily influenced, untruthful, profane, quarrelsome, craving excitement, shrewd, tricky, etc. Bryant (6) studies three hundred women, particularly one hundred and eighteen of them, at the House of Correction in Holmesburg, Pennsylvania. Ordahl and Ordahl (27) present a study of four hundred and thirty-two delinquent and dependent girls who had been committed to a State Training School for Girls.

II. *Statistical Studies of Juvenile Delinquents.*—Horn (18) publishes a study of fifty-three juvenile court wards, twenty-four of whom were delinquents. Clark (10) presents a statistical study of one hundred and two boys who had been habitual truants prior to their commitment to Whittier State School. Tables and explanations are given comparing these boys with four hundred and seventy unselected delinquents committed to the school; also tables and explanations concerning the truants alone, as to ages, principal offenses, the number of offenses committed by each truant; the numbers of those who used alcohol, tobacco, and of those who were profane, the intelligence quotients, school grades reached, their ability in school subjects as determined by educational tests; all tabulated by race; the history and conditions of the families of the truants, the grade of homes by race, and the grade of neighborhood, average grade of homes, and a table of index of neighborhoods—by race. McIntyre (22) presents a study of one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two adjudged delinquents by the Manhattan Branch of the Children's Court during 1916 to show the connection between child labor and delinquency. One estimate of the study is that the working children contribute four times their share to the ranks of juvenile delinquency. Merril (24) presents a summary of findings of sexualism in an unselected group of one hundred delinquent boys. Regarding the causes of the misbehavior which brought the boy into the court, it is stated that technically, twenty-eight were arrested for nomadism, loitering and indolence; eighteen, for dishonesty; nine, for truancy; six, for vulgarity on school grounds; six, for sexual misconduct; six, for disorderliness about the commun-

ity; and two, for irritability of temper and disobedience at home. Yet the author shows that sexualism played a large part in causing misconduct which was more directly apparent in the vagrancy cases, but was revealed by analysis in the stealing cases. Tables are given of the height and weight norms, the ages and the intelligence rating of the sex group. The physical depletion was considerable. The author states that the findings indicate that erotism profoundly affects the intellectual processes.

III. *Miscellaneous Statistical Studies.*—Bowers (3) gives the findings of a survey of two thousand five hundred prisoners in the psychopathic laboratory at the Indiana State Prison. He states more or less exactly the frequency of occurrence of diseases and of physical defects and stigmata. He tabulates information, physical, mental, social and economic of the prisoners and their parents. In addition, he gives brief descriptions of several kinds of mental disorders, of sexual perversions, and of feeble-mindedness. He describes the characteristic ways of thinking, feeling and acting on the part of those afflicted with the above maladies, and discusses the characteristics of the crimes which are outcomes, their nature, their frequency, etc. Pintner and Reamer (31) made a study of twenty-six delinquent girls to discover the extent to which the results of mental examination are prognostic of future progress in the world. Tables are given showing rankings according to mental tests; and rankings according to their probable ability to make good, which were made independently by the social investigator, the psychologist, and the superintendent of the institution to which the girls had been committed. In certain cases the two types of ranking differed radically. The conclusion of the study, based on this fact and on the actual progress of the girls after leaving the institution, is that the mental tests were not prognostic of the success. Shideler (33) presents a statistical study of nearly seven thousand six hundred delinquent boys in industrial schools in thirty-one states, giving tables showing the parental and guardianship conditions of the delinquents, the excessive proportion of delinquent boys from cities of over 25,000 inhabitants, etc. Claghorn (9) presents a study of crime and immigration, taking cases of foreign-born prisoners in Sing Sing Prison, giving tables as to country of birth; psychopathological classification; types of offense; types of offenders, as first offenders or recidivists; education; economic status; naturalization and Americanization; recidivism related to nature of offense and intelligence—all by country of birth and in numbers or

per cents. Stanley (35) studies morphinism and crime as shown in one hundred prisoners at San Quentin, stating the age at which the use of the drug began; the manner of using it; amounts used; and the sensations and feelings, when deprived of it, and when under its influence, as to feelings, appetite, digestion, dreams, sexual desire and potentialities, and desire for alcohol. The majority had been convicted of robbery or grand larceny.

It is obvious from the number of the details set forth in the above surveys that it is impossible to state all the findings, and to select certain findings would be to distort values. In general, however, it may be said that the authors agree as to prognosis, prevention, causation, and treatment. On the whole, prognosis is unfavorable; the obstacles in the way being social stigma, habit of thought, feeling and action, and false conception on the part of the public, of criminals and crime, all most difficult to overcome. Prevention requires more clinics, mental and physical, in the schools especially; more or better equipped ones in the courts and correctional institutions; and, especially, it requires training classes in the schools better suited to the needs and capabilities of the low intelligence pupils, and more rational and vocational guidance. Causation continues to be regarded as a complex of social, physical and mental factors, inherited or acquired by the individual. Individual treatment is still considered the only rational procedure, although classes are indicated for general lines of treatment.

IV. *Non-statistical studies.*—Rippen (32) and Hoffman (17) advocate what might be called a Family Court, on the ground that, for example, six delinquent members of a family can more effectively and economically be considered as a unit in one court than as six units in as many independent courts. Such a Family Court would have to do with desertion and non-support, divorce, adoption and guardianship, juvenile and youthful delinquency and dependency. Everson (11) states that the Children's Court registers the evils not only of the individual but of the family and of the community or neighborhood as well. Therefore, he and Thurston (37) emphasize that the best court standards require that the court recognize its responsibility, not merely toward the child but toward the family and the community; that the probation work is therefore not merely individual case work but family case work and community improvement, and that to this latter end social agencies must be represented in court.

As to prisons, Lyon (21) emphasizes the need of new ideas of

housing prisoners. All plans for buildings should be based on the most careful consideration of the psychological effects upon the prisoners of the various forms of housing and on the various types of treatment necessitated by the physical and mental conditions of the inmates. Osborne (28) condemns the *a priori* method of judging what kind of prison treatment is good for prisoners and what prison behavior can be expected from them and demands democracy of management as a working principle, which has proved itself. Kilbride (20) shows under what conditions as to selection of prisoners, wage, work, and environment, labor conscription in the Illinois prisons has been able to change criminals into law-abiding citizens. Hodder (16) states that reformatories of the day are not meeting the needs of the women sentenced thereto. They may be divided into three groups, those who may safely be returned to the community, those who need permanent custodial care, and those about whom prognosis is doubtful. The second group is not reformatable. The third group constitute a problem requiring a new kind of reformatory which shall meet the needs of the individual, attending to the physical and especially to the psychiatric problems which are the predominating factors in crime.

With regard to the better success of probation and parole, Chute (8) advocates state supervision of probation work. Burleigh (7), defining parole of girls as reëducation through which the girl is reabsorbed into community life, states that parole should be separate from the probation system and from the institution in order to make the identification of the girl with the community more complete at the start. Whitman (38) discusses the features of the new parole law of Illinois under which persons sentenced even for murder, rape, treason, and kidnapping can be paroled. This method of administering the law makes parole a very gradual progressive merit system working towards freedom, first within the prison, then from it, and then from all supervision.

Several articles treat of the criminal irresponsibility of the mentally abnormal and subnormal, of their great menace to society, and the need, therefore, of more institutions in which to segregate them. Ballantine (2) and Gordon (13) consider the tests of responsibility in legal theory and practise, and expound the theory of degrees of responsibility corresponding with the mental status. Mead (23) does much to clarify the conception of responsibility in an exposition of the psychology of primitive justice. Several authors discuss the function of psychopathic laboratories in crim-

inology. Fernald (12), Oliver (26), Murray and Kuh (25), Bryant (5), Spaulding (34) show their value as means of diagnosis and of prescription of treatment of offenders. Harding (15) shows their functioning in the case of epileptic prisoners, and Squire (36) in the case of venereally diseased prisoners.

Criminology (30) is a review of criminological literature of value to students of law and of criminology, and to court workers.

The Pawns of Fate (4) and *The Imprisoned Freeman* (39) in the form of stories set forth modern criminological views. The former presents social problems of dependency, delinquency and defectiveness in the history of a down-and-out congenital weakling. The latter sets forth prison abuses, better methods of prison management, false attitudes of society towards offenders, social and hereditary factors in crime, Lombroso's theory of crime and Goring's refutation, all in the vivid concrete form of fiction.

The Unmarried Mother (19) is based on a study of hundreds of case-histories of which five hundred have been selected in illustration of phases of illegitimacy. It recognizes causation to be varied complexes of physical, social, and biological forces, and emphasizes society's responsibility to control and segregate the mentally abnormal woman of child-bearing age, to secure more rational and just legislation, both in regard to the treatment of the mother and of the child, to secure better social conditions and a more wholesome attitude of the public towards questions of sex.

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MAGIC AND RELIGION

BY A. A. GOLDENWEISER

Columbia University

In the domain of magic and religion, as in most other pursuits of the "idle curiosity," the last few years have proved singularly unproductive in significant contributions. But it may perhaps not be amiss, at this time, to review briefly some of the ways in which the nature and origin of magic have been conceived, especially with reference to the nature and origin of religion.

More than once magic has been characterized as anti-social and religion as social, magic as proscribed, religion as prescribed. Jevons (15) recently returns to this view; for this author the difference between the two sets of phenomena lies essentially in the circumstance that these are condemned while those are approved. From this standpoint, "it is the difference between the two sets of proceedings which is [for the author] of cardinal importance, not the similarity in the *modus operandi*" (p. 261). The crudeness of this timeworn attitude discourages careful criticism (*cf.*, however, Thomas (34)); the true source of the author's view, moreover, is revealed in a subsequent passage: "The difference is fundamental for those who believe in magic. It is fundamental for those of us who, though they believe in religion, do not believe in magic. For those of us, however, who believe in neither it can hardly be fundamental" (15, p. 274)).

Magic has been represented as referring to the individual while religion appears as a group function. There is, of course, an element of truth in this, in so far as the magic art, in its later transformations, becomes the prerogative of the individual magician, whereas religion, at all times, is participated in by the community at large. On the other hand, however, religion, no less conspicuously, remains the business of the individual, always relying on him for its inspirations, revivals, emotions and rationalizings,

while magic, during a period of great length extending over a large part of primitive civilization, belongs as intimately to the group as a whole as does religion.

The mechanical character of magical procedure has been emphasized as against the inevitableness of spiritual agencies in the religious complexes of ritual and belief. While not by any means consistently, Frazer on the whole adheres to this view in his *Golden Bough*. Again, the view may not be rejected as wholly erroneous, in so far as spiritual agencies are more uniformly present in religious contexts than they are in those of magic; also, magic, particularly in its capacity of a technique, often involves protracted processes the interconnections of which are purely mechanical, thus often bearing resemblance to matter-of-fact procedure. In religion features of this sort are somewhat exceptional. And yet, anyone who will take pains to compare the magical facts of the Australian medicine man with the strictly analogous performance of his British Columbian confrère, must realize that the participation of spirits in the proceedings is as conspicuous in one set of cases (America) as its absence in the other set (Australia). (Cf. the relevant criticisms of Frazer's position in Lang (18), Marett (25 and 26) and Hartland (10).)

Another interpretation of magic, which we also owe to Frazer, consists in the conception of magic as a sort of primitive science, while religion represents the breakdown of that primal science, falling into a period when the conceit of the all-powerful magician began to give way before the ever more frequent onslaughts of experiential disappointments. Losing faith in himself and in nature, man turned for help to the gods. This doctrine combines a very slight modicum of truth with a fundamental misunderstanding of the entire magical world-view. The regularity and inevitableness of magical connections, however conspicuous to the outsider, form no essential part of the psychic attitude of the magician as agent or as believer in magical connections in nature. His basic belief is in *power* and in its efficacy; the rest is contingent. In criticising Frazer's contention that magic involves the belief "that in nature one event follows another necessarily and invariably," Hartland quite rightly points out that "the intervention of the magician himself is proof of the contrary" (10, p. 73); for were the succession of events fixed, the magician's act could not break into the chain nor would such intervention be necessary. Marett speaks in equally unmistakable terms when he declares that "the

magician surely does not postulate that the same causes will always produce the same effects: on the contrary, his art is based on the supposed possibility of miracle—on what might be called super-causation as contrasted with normal causation" (26, p. 250). (Cf. also Wundt who passes the following judgment on the idea of magic as primitive science: "It seems to me that the belief in magic, if analyzed objectively and kept free from ideas which do not belong to it, contains in its very essence a most convincing refutation of this view" (35, p. 180, note).)

This brings us to those conceptions of magic which ally it to or identify it with supernatural power. A notably constructive effort in this direction is that of Lévy-Bruhl (21). The author describes the supernatural idea and emotion complex of the primitive man as a general *dynamism*, and also goes a step further in suggesting a psychic mechanism by means of which the supernatural bonds are established between beings, things and events. This mechanism the author conceptualizes as a *principle of participation*, in accordance with which multifarious bonds of emotional and intellectual association are established between phenomena which, from our naturalistic standpoint, may seem wholly unrelated (21, pp. 68-151); Lévy-Bruhl's concept of a primitive *dynamism* was anticipated by Lovejoy's primitive *energetics* (22). Lévy-Bruhl thus succeeds in giving psychological plausibility and logical precision to a principle long understood and applied, if in less rigorous fashion, but the author errs in exaggerating beyond all proportion the rôle played in the psychic world of the savage by these supernatural cycles of participation. (For a critical estimate of the author's position compare my critique (5), also Rivers's article (31) and my comments on Lévy-Bruhl and Rivers (6).)

With the introduction of conceptions such as Lévy-Bruhl's the line of demarcation between magic and religion becomes blurred,—one is confronted with primitive supernaturalism, such as has been made familiar to ethnologists and others under the catch-word designation of *mana*. The contributions to this branch of the subject fall into three groups. First come the writings of those who, in the course of personal contact with primitive peoples have become familiar with manaistic conceptions, at first hand. Among these mention must be made of Codrington (2), Hewitt (11), Jones (16), Miss Fletcher (4), and Pechuel-Loesche (28) in whose hands the fetichistic phenomena of West Africa have received new illumination through the *mana* idea. The merit of these

contributions is to have established beyond cavil the presence and wide occurrence in the primitive world of a belief in supernatural magic power of a non-personal sort. By this is not meant, however, that the problem can be solved by simply identifying such conceptions as *mana*, *fadi*, *orenda*, *manitou*, etc., and regarding them as so many illustrations of the primitive concept of impersonal supernatural power. The latter concept, held perhaps by all even most primitive tribes, but scarcely ever expressed in language, constitutes but the common core of the more advanced concepts of particular tribes or tribal groups, which concepts having received terminological expression, become subject to mutations of meaning, to accretions of content, due to changing cultural settings and to other historic causes of conceptual transformations.

To the second group of contributions belong the writings of such authors as Marett (24, 25, 26) and Preuss (29), who have proceeded less cautiously and, having applied synthesis and generalization to the more concrete data of the other authors, have constructed a supernatural world of primitive animatism (Marett) or magic (Preuss). They have also chronologized the conception, giving it priority over animism. While it seems justifiable to go beyond the necessarily fragmentary picture resulting from the concrete contributions, Marett and Preuss have certainly gone too far in their elaborations of the nature and scope of *mana* or magic, the chronological reference to animism being of an especially dubious character. (Cf. also the numerous discussions of *mana* at the Third International Congress of Religions (14), which contains no original contributions, and the theoretically more guarded articles by Lowie (23) and the writer (7). A convenient summary, up to 1910, of the discussions centering about the *mana* concept, will be found in King (17, pp. 134-164).) Among the writers who adhere to the more limited use of the *mana* conception note must be taken of Wundt (35, pp. 171-177, 185-188) and Radin (31, 344-351), whose stand in opposition to *mana* deserves careful consideration in view of the author's extensive experience with two tribal groups of American Indians.

The third group of writers, finally, is dominated by the figure of Durkheim (3). The French sociologist and his disciples, Hubert, Mauss and, to a degree, Beuchat (12, 13, 27), have incorporated the *mana* conception into every part of their theories of magic and religion; but the distinctiveness of their attitude consists in the drastically social derivation given by Durkheim and his followers

to magic, religion, *mana* and the very notion of the sacred. No adequate presentation of Durkheim's brilliant but not convincing argument can be given here; suffice it to say that the individual sources of religious experience and development are no more justifiably underestimated in his system, than were the sociological and historical sources in the systems of his predecessors, Spencer and Tylor. (Cf. my critique of Durkheim (9) and Miss Campbell's *Manaism* (1). Miss Campbell's dissertation is rather carefully done, although in no sense original. She is evidently greatly influenced by Durkheim's position. See also Saintyves (32) and Söderblom (33).)

A notable attempt to analyze psychologically the nature and origins of magic and religion has been made by Leuba (19, 20). An important element of the author's attitude is expressed in the following passage: "I maintain that in seeking to replace belief in personal agents (animism) by *mana*, which leaves in solution the distinction between personal and impersonal, Marett disregards the only definite line of cleavage which can be used to differentiate religious from non-religious life; that is, the line separating the attitudes and actions that involve the idea of personal power from those that do not. In my view of the matter, when the distinction between personal and impersonal is in solution, religion itself is in solution" (20, p. 74, note 1). In this significant formulation the author definitely breaks with those who see the test of religion in an emotional attitude, such as *the religious thrill*, and transfers the weight of the distinction between religion and non-religion into the conceptual domain. Thus the author is led to see non-personal power (such as *mana*) in a different light from the authors reviewed before. We read: "The original idea of non-personal power possesses but one necessary characteristic: *it is dynamic, it does things*" (20, p. 83). Once more we have *dynamism* (cf. Lovejoy and Lévy-Bruhl), which to Leuba means "power," without any necessary connotation of the mysterious or wonderful. But as the workings of this power are to a great extent unforeseen and uncontrollable, it evokes commonly dread and awe (83). While space is lacking for either an exposition or a criticism of the author's doctrines, note must be taken of a number of important theoretical principles which place the author's discussion on a level compatible with modern ethnological theory. The principles are: god-ideas of different origin have subsequently interacted upon one another (20, p. 99); the fundamental ideas underlying primitive religious

conceptions are based on normal and universal mental processes, thus being common to primitive and to modern man ("There are few men living today," writes Leuba, "barring the mentally defective, who, if deprived of the inheritance of civilization, would not people an unseen world with these unreal creatures" (20, p. 100)); the limitation of objective knowledge in primitive society is one of the mainsprings of the peculiar idiosyncrasies of the savage (20, p. 170). The summary of the author's conclusions with reference to the nature and mutual relations of magic and religion deserves to be stated in full: (1) Magic and religion have had independent origins. Neither of them need be regarded as a derivation from the other. (2) Magic contributed very little directly to the making of religion. (3) The simpler forms of magic probably antedate religion. (4) Because they are different ways of achieving the same ends, magical and religious practices are closely associated. (5) Religion is social and beneficial; magic is dominantly individual and evil. (6) Magic is of shorter duration than religion. (7) Science is closely related neither to magic nor to religion, but to the mechanical type of behavior (20, p. 176).

In a recent article I have made the attempt to account for the basic elements in religion in an epistemological way. The treatment is very concise and must be taken in the nature of a preliminary statement. The religious thrill, the fundamental emotional reaction in all religious experience, is taken for granted; it is characterized as "one of the most deeply rooted and ancient traits in the psychic organization of man" (8, p. 639) and no attempt is made to analyze it any further. The concepts subjected to epistemological treatment are "spirit" and "mana." Having pointed out the intellectualistic character of animism ("animism as such is not a religion, but a *Weltanschauung*"), I formulate the derivation of spirit in the following terms: "The specific channels through which particular groups of men have arrived at the animistic interpretation of nature are no doubt many and varied, but a most general *rationale* of the process may perhaps be given in the following formula: *Whereas the generalized experience of the behavior of things compatible with gross and permanent materiality becomes crystallized in the consciousness of man as the world of matter, the generalized experience of the behavior of things incompatible with gross and permanent materiality finds conceptual expression in the world of spirit*" (8, p. 633). Thus we have spirit, but so far it is outside of religion, a pure concept. (cf. Leuba (20, p. 111). The generalized

explanation of the association of spirit with the religious thrill is given in these words: "*The same peculiarities in the behavior of things which are responsible for the conceptualization of a world of spirit, are also responsible for the early association of the world of spirit with the religious thrill*" (8, p. 634).¹

Before proceeding to the deduction of "mana," it must be noted that the concept of which a psychological explanation is attempted in the essay, is not the specialized concept of *mana* or *orenda* or *manitou*, etc., but the more general and vague notion of supernaturalism of impersonal magic power, which is constantly found associated with magic and religion. "It seems fairly certain"—to quote the passage—"that the notion of *mana*, as entertained in most primitive times, must be directly correlated with the religious thrill. The psychological derivation of *mana* may be expressed in the following formula: *The generalized experience of the behavior of things associated with the religious thrill receives conceptual expression in mana*. *Mana* thus is the direct objectivation of the religious emotion, it is *that which causes the (religious) thrill*. We have seen before that the religious emotion, and with it, we may now add, the concept of *mana*, supernatural power, must have become associated with spirit from the earliest times. Now, while *mana* thus becomes in part absorbed by spirit, psychological plausibility again suggests the assumption that it does not become wholly absorbed. While spirits are many and varied, in form as well as in function, they all have *mana*, they all arouse the religious thrill; but so also do other beings, things, events, not associated with spirits. Thus the common thrill-producing element in all religious situations, whether centering in a spiritual or a material thing, may be expected to preserve its separate conceptualization on a par with spirit and other carriers of the religious. . . . Thus spirit and *mana* must be characterized as the fundamental concepts of all religion" (8, pp. 635-6).

The section on magic, or rather the magic act, in my essay is very fragmentary, also it is too long for incorporation in this review.

¹ This formulation must be pronounced somewhat unfortunate in so far as many experiences of the behavior of things contributory to the notion of spirit are quite free from any elements which might evoke the religious reaction. The very numerous residual cases are, however, amply sufficient to account for the association. The formula ought to read thus: *in a large number of situations the behavior of things responsible for the conceptualization of a world of spirit is accompanied by features apt to arouse the religious thrill; often the same elements of the behavior will do service in both directions*.

The principal points are these: "a magical act, as such, may be described psychologically as *an expression in behavior of a mental content the core of which is a desire*. . . . Desires, in order to lead to expression in behavior representative or symbolic of the object desired must reach a certain degree of intensity. . . . When subsequent to the magical act the things present themselves, the events occur, they are brought into causal connection with the magical act" (8, p. 638. Cf. Leuba; (20, pp. 157 and 167-87)). The saturation of the magic procedure with religious emotion, finally, is due to certain peculiarities of the magic act which differentiate it from an act of matter-of-fact behavior.

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APPLIED ASPECTS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY CLARK L. HULL

University of Wisconsin

Henderschott (5) believes that men are very prone to overestimate their own value as workers. If some way could be found to bring each man adequately to realize his actual value to the employer it would greatly reduce discontent. The present industrial unrest is more psychological than economic. The wise use of social psychology should relegate the matter of wage to a secondary and more true position as an object of contention. McChesney (7) urges that the secret of efficiency in factory operation lies in the employer's having the confidence and respect of the employees. This confidence and respect functions as an active coöperation. It can only be obtained by sincerely seeking and securing the welfare of the employees. Fish (4) says that the turnover in labor which in the aggregate is enormously expensive is greatly reduced by creating pleasant mental and physical surroundings in the shops. Good mental conditions are promoted by competitive games, picnics and celebrations where employers, employees and

heads of departments mingle freely. Pensions and life insurance such as are ordinarily offered by employers are of slight value in preventing the labor turnover. The reputation of a factory for good treatment of employees insures an ample supply of the best type of applicants for jobs. Applicants responding to advertisements are very apt to be floaters and otherwise undesirable. Safety appliances in shops, while preventing accidents to a certain extent, are chiefly of psychological value. They serve as a tangible assurance to the workman of the good intention of the employer. A more efficient preventive of accidents lies in the training of the employees in safe methods of work. The disposition of the foreman is of extreme importance. Some foremen have a constructive influence and men constantly improve under them while others tend to break down the ability of workmen. Metcalf (8) pleads for a social regeneration of business through a spirit of coöperation between employer and employees.

Eastman (3) and Hoover (6) each go into the practical psychological details of making a sales solicitation. Both writers enlarge upon the means of utilizing suggestion and avoiding negative suggestion, particularly at the critical "closing" stage.

Eastman (2) writes convincingly of the vicious exploitation of suggestion by style originators who thereby induce the purchase of inappropriate, extravagant and unnecessary clothing. The general psychology of clothing both in its personal and its social aspects is discussed at length by Dearborn (1) in a quasi-literary fashion. He relates a number of anecdotes to prove that good clothes have a favorable influence upon getting jobs.

Peterson and David (9) have produced an excellent little work on the psychology of handling men in the army. While written with the strictly practical purpose of applying psychology to the achievement of military efficiency, it contains considerable vigorous theory. They believe that "in handling men it is well to take toward them the attitude of practical determinism." We often "make the mistake of thinking of men as primarily rational beings." They are not. "Instinct is the driving force . . . of our lives." "If a person's environment could be completely controlled, he could doubtless, with a proper understanding of his nature, be played upon like a musical instrument and made to conform to one's wishes." The body of the book explains in general how this may be done, particularly in the army.

Competition is a potent force in facilitating military training.

It may be either between persons or between groups. "In group competition we retain the stimulating effect of certain individuals being pitted against others and leave out the more unpleasant personalities coming up in individual rivalry." For competition to be really effective, accurate measures of performance must be available. The authors hope for the development of such methods of measurement according to the principles of the modern educational tests. The innate tendency to play may be utilized as a potent preventative of "shell shock" and other mental disturbances resulting from the great anxiety and nervous exhaustion of life in the trenches. It acts by giving the soldier temporary relief from the frightful strain. Moreover, group games and athletic contests conduce strongly to *esprit de corps* and teamplay so necessary in modern war. Formal drills are not in themselves particularly valuable in this respect. Certain individuals lacking in patriotism may respond very satisfactorily to this group consciousness.

"Success of an army more than any other organization is built upon the foundation of leadership." Leadership "unquestionably depends largely upon innate qualities" but it can be improved by knowledge and training.

Discipline, "the soul of armies" is held to be characteristically different in democracies from that of autocracies in that in the former the whole intelligence and emotional life of the soldier is enlisted "because he feels that it is necessary for the common good." Discipline has its basis largely in habit. In times of great emotional stress fairly well formed habits may fail to function accurately. Consequently the habits involved in military discipline and team play must be mechanized to the highest degree possible. The acquisition of these habits may be greatly accelerated by skillful appeals to the instincts. Individual instruction is necessitated to a considerable degree by the great individual differences among recruits.

A modern army requires in each unit a definite number of men skilled to certain degrees in the greatest variety of trades. This skill existed in chance bits scattered through the newly recruited army. The method of finding, evaluating and utilizing this skill is described by various authors (10). The first step in the process was to make out for each recruit a "Qualification card" on which was recorded much important information regarding his experience, education and skill. But as soldiers' accounts of their

abilities in the various occupations were frequently very inaccurate, special tests were devised for determining ability in a very large number of trades. The tests ranged from oral informational tests in some trades to actual performance in others. Before being used the tests were tested for diagnostic efficiency by applying them to groups of men known to possess various known degrees of skill in the particular trades. One of the most ingenious applications of psychology to the problems of individual differences in the army is the officer's rating scale.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

BY ELLSWORTH FARIS

State University of Iowa

Delacroix (2) in a comprehensive paper written as a chapter of a book, the publication of which was interrupted by the war, writes on Nature and Convention, Phonetic Laws, Development of Language, Expression of Thought, Changes of Meaning, and Special Languages. The author is largely indebted to Wundt, to whom he makes frequent reference and whose view of speech as vocal gesture he adopts. The problem of origin is declared to be insoluble. The two questions, How does the natural expression of emotion become a symbol, and How does man select the sounds

for speech, are both declared to be beyond the reach of scientific method. Concerning phonetic laws, there are two classes of phenomena involved: the modifications due to the conformation of the organs of articulation, and the reactions which depend on the reactions of the elements of the phrase. Neither the ancient Greek view that modifications are guided by an esthetic motive (euphony), nor the Hindu theory that it is a logical concern can be accepted. Every such change has a definite explanation in physiology, analogy and borrowing being extensions of habits formed in the musculature. For example, in the second group of changes, if a movement in a group of words is repeated twice, the second of the movements tends to be omitted in speech. With regard to the development of speech in the infant, the rôle of imitation has been overstated, many of the cases being really adult adaptations to the infant's capacity. With regard to the psychology of the judgment, it is recognized that the sentence is the element and that the word has no separate existence. There are five grammatical categories corresponding to the four psychological—verbs, nouns, adjectives, morphemes and particles. Semantics can always be characterized by this psychological fact or process. The concept is a complex representation of which we accentuate one character which in its turn attracts the attention and becomes the focus of another generalization. The influence of the social life is also recognized. And each special calling and occupation produces variant forms, even monstrosities.

Meillet (3) has made a contribution in discussing the convergence of linguistic development. The problem is how to account for the spontaneous activity which results in uniformity of speech over a considerable area. While this problem is not yet solved, the argument shows that the conditions of human behavior and of social life tend to produce the same changes in widely separated communities. "The convergences observed lead us to conclude that in linguistic changes the innovations are general rather than generalized, and that the identity or equality of conditions where the speaking subjects are found is the essential fact, and that imitation is a secondary consideration." The individual creations in language are confined to vocabulary and to phrases which are in their turn generalized, but these are the phenomena which show no tendency to convergence. Two closely related dialects will show the widest divergence in vocabulary. Inflection tends to hide the unity of the word, it also tends to lose its expressiveness and to

require some special method to denote emphasis, and in the third place the inflections vary according to the classes of words, conjugations for example. "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the history of Indo-European languages may be comprised in the statement that it is an effort to pass from the word-form with multiple inflections to the word existing isolated and always invariable in form."

The article of Brandenburg (1) is the report of an experimental investigation of the relation of vocabulary to general intelligence. Subsidiary problems are illuminated, including the relation of the extent of vocabulary to scholastic attainments, the relation of accuracy and precision in the knowledge and use of words to vocabulary range, and the probable effect of the enforced silence of the school room on the development of the child. The method was to take a list of two hundred words, one for each 140 in Webster's *Academic Dictionary*, selected at equal intervals throughout the dictionary, and having submitted the printed list of words to the pupil, consider that word familiar which was used with even approximate correctness in a sentence. The vocabulary was assumed to include one hundred and forty times as many words as were used in the test. The average ranged from 4,000 in Grade II to 15,340 in Grade X. A correlation between vocabulary range and language ability was worked out and found to be .76, and about the same relation was found to exist in the case of excellence in oral expression. When compared to scholarship the coefficient ranges from .39 to .85 with an average of .56. From these facts this conclusion is drawn: "The opinion that there are certain individuals who have a large fund of words at their command and are very proficient in the use of words generally but are mentally weak and inefficient, is by no means well founded." The manual training grades were compared and it was found that linguistic ability and motor ability did not tend strongly to coincide. The tests in arithmetic, reading, spelling, and mental ability were then applied and the conclusion reached that school grades are, after all, a very good indication of general intelligence. The final conclusion is that the repression of the modern school room is carried too far, producing timidity and even dread.

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RELIGION AND EDUCATION

BY E. S. AMES

University of Chicago

There is real need for a social psychology based upon the newer objective psychology. W. Trotter has shown that the social, moral and religious tendencies of man are truly instinctive. He emphasizes the herd-instinct, or gregariousness, in man. It is in reality an instinct-complex, or mechanism, involving suggestibility, approval, shame, etc. How does gregariousness, or any instinct, become the source or origin of morality? By the development of associations, as in the transfer of tendency from one stimulus to another, and in the conditional reflex. The latter is illustrated by ringing a bell when feeding a hungry dog and thus causing, after repetition, a flow of saliva by the ringing of the bell alone. Perhaps a thorough scientific inquiry would show that moral ideals and sentiments of custom, convention and fashion are conditional reflexes built largely upon the original tendencies of the herd-control complex.

In applying these principles to moral education Folsom (1) urges that it is important to direct attention less to motives and more to external results. Murder of an individual horrifies us but we overlook the horrors of food adulteration, and exploitation of workers. While morality tends to be measured in terms of social welfare, there are many errors in the application of this view. Mutation and natural selection have not yet had a chance to adapt man's instincts to his present environment. Moral exhortations, as in sermons and scolding, are relatively ineffective. New methods of child training are necessary, especially in city life. Conduct must be viewed in terms of cause and effect and not merely in terms of an accepted moral code. Man must learn to worry more about his ignorance than his badness of motives.

The medieval saint was a specialist with social functions as definite as those of king, knight, butcher or baker, writes Mecklin (5); he cannot be democratized. He must be mystical and subjective. His virtues belong to the passive type. The saint flourishes only in a simple society. The complexities of modern life are inimical to him. As these are felt more and more to be the carriers of moral and spiritual values the saint loses his significance and leadership. "It is our Lincolns, our Florence Nightingales, our

Booker T. Washingtons, that seem after all to have caught and interpreted the universal values of the age."

In "Sociology as Ethics," Hayes (3) expresses his faith in the social sciences. Ethics has rested on legalistic religion, on divine law enforced by rewards and punishments. This foundation has been shaken. The result is for many a sense of license, of emancipation from moral restraints. Will the next generation have an ethics? The only science that can equip us with an ethics is the scientific study of human life. "There already is promise that investigation of the special problems of ethics by the sociological method will prove to be reconstructive of a modified world-view not less adapted to afford guidance, motive, and worth to life, and having the incalculable advantage over the old world-view of being impregnable to any attacks by incongruous facts, and requiring no blinking of the clear eyes of intellectual honesty."

"The most effectively divine power or agency in the world to-day is" according to Geiger (2) the social consciousness of a genuinely democratic community. It is the social consciousness as the ideal embodiment of the hard-won values of mankind that is effecting whatever of good there is in our present-day life and civilization." The function of religion today is to find the sources of religious satisfaction in the empirical and practical values "constituting the divine as it exists to-day," and make them the instruments of moral control. Conventional religion does neither, either for the conservative or the progressive man. A new type of religious experience is needed with new symbols and new imagery.

In "A Return To God in Education" Carl Holliday (4) remarks that in spite of universal intellectual training Germany reverted to a war of barbarism, and that in spite of the artistic spirit in France and of uplift for the masses in England, these nations have manifested the hatred and fury of savagery. Have we put too much faith in *art* and *culture* and *invention*? What is needed to achieve real civilization is a development of the moral emotions, and education of the soul; in short, a return to some form of religious training. Lincoln attained a civilized state of mind,—a profound emotional response to moral ideals and to real religion.

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SPECIAL REVIEWS

A Social Theory of Education. G. A. COE. New York: Scribners, 1917. Pp. xii + 361.

This work presents a wide field of religious problems organized around the educational task. First of all is the social theory of religion. In his *Psychology of Religion* the author has elaborated this view, showing that religion is fundamentally an experience of personality and of relations between persons. The first concern of education is therefore "the persons with whom the pupil is in contact." The school introduces the pupil to community life and gives him real functions in it. This conception of education, set forth particularly by Professor Dewey, is applied to religious education by Professor Coe in a thorough fashion.

Since the aim of religion is conceived as the establishment of a "democracy of God," it becomes the aim of religious education to fit the individual to take his part in this democracy. "The only test for the Christian education of the will lies in increase of the social efficiency of the pupils." This efficiency is measured in terms of health, food, laws, ballot-boxes, homes, streets, schools, happy children, and happy husbands and wives (p. 56). Devotion to social welfare, social justice, and a world society is the concrete expression of devotion to God. To know about these things is to know about God. To work for them is to work for God. To be socially minded and socially efficient is to be religious.

The materials for religious education are therefore to be found in the social process itself. The Biblical material has value in so far as it reflects and promotes this process, but no farther. The grading of a curriculum should have reference to the development of the pupil in appreciation and participation in social living, rather than in his acquaintance with Hebrew history and literature. Much of the Biblical material is unusable because it refers to so different an age and is couched in autocratic and ethically outgrown terms.

The religious training of the child consists in leading him to an intelligent and creative participation in complex human relation-

ships and values. It cannot be done by routine or memoriter methods, but only by living, growing experience, for which the child becomes increasingly responsible and efficient. The curriculum is transformed into "a graded series of experiments in social living." Family life, play life, school life, civic life, occupation, marriage, present a widening process of experience and growth which is natural and is prescribed by the very conditions of living in this world. These interests are organically interrelated and flow on from one to another. They grow through play and work and friendship.

These natural group relations afford the basis for the organization of the system of education in every respect. The family is the first and most impressive center for the child. The home needs to be democratic in order to be religious. Equality of the sexes, participation of all the members in deliberations over practical problems, regular duties for all members, real responsibility in some spheres, common pleasures and a vital sense of relation to other social groups are among the educative possibilities of the family. Training for married life and parenthood should also be included.

Constructive criticism of the Church School is offered and an interesting account is given of the relation of Church and State in America. "The interest of a socialized religious education in the public schools is not that they should teach religion in addition to reading, writing and arithmetic, but that they should teach democracy, and that they should do it thoroughly." On this principle denominational instruction as such is overcome and all bodies reach a common ground. This applies also to college training and to the equipment of professional and religious workers. It makes the social ideal a new means of interdenominational coöperation.

A survey of existing tendencies in religious education reveals in striking contrast the conceptions of different traditions.

It is difficult to bring one's self to criticize a work of such fine spirit and of so much constructive merit. In a sense the discussion of the precise nature of the instinctive basis of the social consciousness cannot lessen the force of the fact that religion is an expression of that social consciousness. But there are important psychological questions here. Has Professor Coe established his contention for the central importance of the parental instinct in religious experience? Has he sufficiently dealt with the possibility of accounting for the phenomena which he ascribes to this instinct by referring them to the instincts of pity, sympathy, fondling, imitativeness,

etc.? Would it be any less consistent to account for certain social attitudes in childhood by referring them to rudimentary manifestations of the sex instinct than it is to assign them to the parental instinct? The latter certainly can scarcely be said to reach maturity earlier than the sex instinct to which it is surely vitally related!

In his emphasis upon the social significance of adolescence (pp. 157, 159), the author appears to labor under the difficulty of giving sufficient recognition to the sex instinct without reducing somewhat his claims for the parental instinct. While it is undoubtedly true that adolescence may develop in ways which are prejudicial to the larger social interests, it is also evident that the parental instinct is not always manifested in ideal expressions. Too much parental care "spoils" children, weakens them, and defeats them. Certainly intelligence and training are just as necessary to the best forms of parental behavior as to any other form of action dependent upon the basic instincts.

The discussion of "anti-social" instincts (pp. 129 ff.) raises two questions. First, is the term instinct used with sufficient discrimination? Second, are not the attitudes described capable of socialization, for example, acquisitiveness, rivalry, mastery, anger, pugnacity? Is not the "pursuit" of truth a sublimation of the hunting process? Some instincts are undoubtedly social, some are non-social, but it is a fair question whether any instincts are anti-social, though anti-social habits may be developed from them.

This work opens an entirely new perspective for the problems which it treats. The tone of the discussion is reverent and not infrequently employs familiar phrases of piety. The effect which it will produce upon religious education is likely to be more revolutionary than the first reading indicates, which is also one among its numerous merits.

E. S. AMES

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Theories of Social Progress. A. J. TODD. New York: Macmillan, 1918. Pp. 579.

The philosophy of education is being reconstructed from the sociological standpoint; and no book has appeared recently that is a more significant contribution to the new educational theory. It is unfortunate that the title of Professor Todd's book does not reveal its educational bearing. Educators should recognize it as a profound treatise on the function of education in a democracy; it

was recognized from the first as a distinct contribution to sociology (see Professor Small's review in the *Amer. J. of Sociol.* for May, 1918).

"Social advance depends upon the extent to which knowledge is diffused and the freedom with which it pervades all classes of society" (p. 471). This is the keynote of the book. The chapters in Part III treat the various theories of progress that have been current from time to time. Some of the titles are: Geographic Determinists, The Technicians or Inventionists, The Economic Interpretation of History, The Eugenists, The Militarists, Government, Public Opinion, Great Men, Heroes and Elite, Religion, The Idealists, etc. In every chapter Todd shows that education is the ultimate determinant.

Professor Todd reiterates the message that was proclaimed twenty-five years ago by Professor Ward—whom educators have so little read; only Todd proclaims it with more scientific and exhaustive scholarship, if with less genius. The message is prophetic, especially in the present reconstruction crises. "Genius exists in nearly everyone" (p. 269). Large "social waste" results from "unguided personal ability" due to grossly inadequate education (pp. 271, 533). Along with the individual power of initiating changes there must be "a social aggregate capable of appreciating them." Ideas such as these occur with increasing emphasis. The outline of an educational system adequate to the needs of our developing democracy constitutes the climax of the work.

It is of the greatest importance that educators acquire the point of view set forth in this book.

ROSS L. FINNEY

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

An Introduction to Educational Sociology. W. R. SMITH. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1917. Pp. 412.

Sociology has as much contribution to make to education as psychology. That fact is slowly becoming obvious. Educational theory is being gradually readjusted to this new insight, courses in educational sociology are being offered in normal schools and colleges, and a substantial literature is appearing. Dr. Smith's contribution to this literature has attracted wide attention.

The book is in two parts: The first deals with Sociological Foundations, the second with Educational Applications. Dr. Smith's sociological analysis in the first part shows the influence of

Professor Cooley. In Chapter II he reviews Cooley's theory of the relation between the individual and the social order, pointing out certain educational implications. Cooley's primary groups, the family, the play group, and the community, occupy the reader's attention in the next two chapters. The informal educational function of these groups, the importance of coöperation between them and the school, and the school's responsibility to train for participation therein, are, however, none too plainly implied. Smith very happily uses the term intermediate groups to denote institutions less closely related to the individual, and devotes a chapter (VII) to them. Chapter VIII, *The State and Education*, contains a discussion of educational aims: vocational, social, cultural and political. In the last two chapters of Part I he discusses the rise of democracy, its influence upon the growth of education, and education's function therein.

Such practical problems as administration, discipline, the curriculum, vocational education, the fine arts, and educational methods are discussed in Part II, from a distinctly sociological point of view. An urgent plea is made for the social survey as a method of securing data for the guidance of school administration.

Dr. Smith intends his book as a textbook to be used in normal schools and colleges, and for that purpose it is of much value, and perhaps as teachable as any book in the field. He is more overtly sociological than Robbins, but not more so than Betts, while the latter's insight is more penetrating. He unaccountably ignores Dewey's *Democracy and Education*, which, in intention at least, is profoundly sociological. Bobbitt's *The Curriculum*, and Todd's *Theories of Social Progress* have both appeared since. The former is sociological, and the latter educational, without announcing themselves as such. They both supplement Smith's point of view.

There are some notable omissions from this book. The problem of individualism versus institutionalism is not discussed. The historic perspective is short; social evolution and the social heritage are not sufficiently virile concepts; the writer's optimism respecting current changes, social and educational, is too easy. He does not sufficiently discern the necessity for directing educational development, nor appreciate the need for extensive educational expansion and readjustment. There is too much localism, and not enough nationalism or internationalism in his program. He does not attack the curriculum problem with sufficient vigor, nor expound the function of the high school profoundly. He has little to say about the

distribution of wealth, and the bearing of popular education thereon; nor does he discern with prophetic insight what must be the spiritual foundations of the new social order if it is to be successful. To be sure, he wrote before the reconstruction; but from the standpoint of history and social evolution it might have been foreseen.

ROSS L. FINNEY.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

The Psychology of Conviction. J. JASTROW. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918. Pp. xix + 387.

Eight of the essays which make up this volume are collected from the magazines in which they had appeared separately. They include the title essay, *The Psychology of Conviction*, related papers on *Belief and Credulity* and *The Will to Believe in the Supernatural*, and a series dealing with illustrative cases, *The Case of Paladino*, *The Antecedents of the Study of Character and Temperament* (an historical survey of fanciful interpretations before the rise of modern scientific psychology), *Fact and Fable in Animal Psychology* ("Der kluge Hans," etc.), "Malicious Animal Magnetism" (Mrs. Eddy's obsession), and *The Democratic Suspicion of Education*. The three new essays are on *The Psychology of Indulgence: Alcohol and Tobacco*, *The Feminine Mind*, and *Militarism and Pacifism*. The variety of topics is at first sight perplexing, for the title of the volume suggests a unity, *The Psychology of Conviction*, and not that *and other essays*. The unity, in fact, is to be found in the purpose. The book has a single theme, the interplay of logic and psychology in the formation and operation of beliefs, but the author does not seek to develop it systematically, but to exhibit it in a number of illustrative instances. The field for selection is here limitless, so that, had the author chosen to do so, he might have included in the volume essays on Bolshevism, the League of Nations, Vivisection and Vaccination (both of which he does indeed refer to incidentally), the Composition of the Hexateuch, and any of the innumerable subjects of controversy present and past in which decisions so frequently depend on prejudice and "passion." He has chosen such instances as specially interested him and as he doubtless deemed would interest his readers. The cases chosen, moreover, represent a variety of types exhibiting the factors in operation in different patterns, with varying emphasis. For the psychology of conviction cannot be reduced to a single formula; it belongs to the most complex of the mental processes and

varies with the varying types. Hence the advantage of the "case" method of treatment with the opportunity it affords for special analysis illustrating the specific working of the diverse factors in play in the concrete.

Among the essays of greatest interest in the volume are those dealing with belief in the supernatural. Under this term is included, apparently, all that conflicts, or that seems to conflict, with orthodox science. The conflict here, as the author views it, is between the spirit of science seeking to establish systematic relationships by logic and evidence and the other motives of our nature which seek their satisfaction in an unorganized region not subject to ordinary scientific criteria. He does not withhold appreciation of what has been accomplished by other than scientific methods in the past, and he is too good a psychologist to suppose that logic alone will ever of itself be able to meet the needs and supply the motives of human living. But he demands that the spirit of science shall at least enter into the domain of belief for guidance and control. And this he thinks is far from being the case with belief in the occult. Evidence here plays a subsidiary rôle. People believe in the super-physical causes of the phenomena chiefly because of their prepossessions and their inability critically to sift the evidence. The evidence, when critically examined, is flimsy. The "case" of Paladino is in this reference taken as typical. Eminently respectable investigators, including some well-known men of science, testified to the genuineness of her phenomena; yet she was caught tricking in the Cambridge (Eng.) séances in 1895, dramatically exposed in New York in 1910 and on several other occasions both suspected and discovered to be a fraud. To be sure, a lingering doubt still hangs in some minds over her case, for in the experiments conducted at Naples in 1908 by Fielding, Carrington and Baggally the conditions as reported appear to have been fairly rigid. But she undoubtedly did frequently resort to trickery and may have done so always. *Passe (-passe) pour Paladino*. But can we generalize? Professor Jastrow thinks that we may. What is true of the super-physical facts of mediums may be accepted, he says, as typical of the whole range of evidence. The evidence reduces to this: on such and such occasions the facts have been satisfactorily accounted for as more or less clever utilizations of plain everyday physical forces, and on such and such other occasions the observers have been unable to discover how what seemed to them to occur was really accomplished. The inference suggested is that in all cases

the phenomena are probably explicable by physical or other recognized causes. "The step from fact to explanation is taken not as a logical inference, but as a psychological inclination" (p. 97).

The conclusion seems sound for the majority of believers, but the primary question relates not to explanation, but to fact. Here there is room for the benevolent sceptic. No incomplete enumeration of instances can conclusively prove a universal. There are, moreover, in science as in common life varying degrees of evidence. One may have little or no inclination to believe in "spirits" and yet recognize in the alleged phenomena of "psychical research" a *prima facie* ground for enquiry. As Professor Jastrow himself says, we have not yet boxed the compass of knowledge, and one of the men to whom he dedicates his book is, significantly, William James. But, he complains, in phenomena of the Paladino type, the conditions of investigation are unsatisfactory; they are not set by the enquirer, but by the medium, who yields to the enquiry only within the limits of the trick. "It cannot be too strongly emphasized that if those who profess to influence physical objects without contact were willing to submit to the experimental rules of the laboratory, the investigation would be a matter of minutes and not of years" (p. 113). One would like to know more precisely what the rules are that would here apply. The experimenter must adapt himself to the conditions of the phenomena as well as impose conditions on the phenomena. It is objected that the phenomena produced by the mediums occur usually only in darkness or semi-darkness. This is, of course, suspicious, and the will not to believe, which is just as potent in its way as the will to believe, refuses to accept the given explanation. But there are plenty of phenomena in nature to which the absence of light is essential, as *e.g.*, the growth of the child in the womb, of the seed in the soil, certain chemical reactions made use of in coast lighting, and no objection is interposed to their investigation. Surely, if a minimum of light is required for the production of certain mediumistic phenomena, or for their production on certain occasions, it should not pass the wit of man to discover the fact, although the discovery might take years and not minutes. Yet after all Professor Jastrow is right in emphasizing the negative considerations in the interest of sanity and as a bulwark against popular superstition. Only let it be remembered that the psychologist, like every other expert, has the bias of his profession.

Of the three new essays that on indulgence in alcohol and to-

bacco is of timely interest in view of the recent action of our legislatures in voting for national prohibition. If all who so voted had read and duly weighed what the psychologist had to say on the relation of indulgence to vital needs and on the dangers of repression, the result might have been different, although they would also have received his acknowledgment of the force of other considerations, economic and moral. His breadth of view and the reasonableness of his contentions should at least have operated against a bigoted fanaticism which by emphasizing one phase or certain phases of the evil of intemperance disturbs the diagnosis and, as he says, makes for unreason. The essay on the feminine mind is equally timely in its relation to the whole contemporary feminist movement. Taking as a guiding principle that like minds in unlike bodies are a contradiction for physiological psychology and supporting the contention by observation and argument, the author concludes that women do "possess a distinctive type of mentality . . . with distinctive differences of manner and composition and effect; and all this by reason of the different composite of their supporting qualities and their setting in the total feminine nature" (p. 313). This may not determine the question of suffrage, but it has an important bearing on occupations, for there are some employments in which small differences are highly significant. The last essay, written while the war was still in progress, deals in part with the exaggerations on both sides of the controversy between militarism and pacificism due to the state of public feeling and the ambiguities of the terms. Its main trend is indicated in the closing paragraph in words peculiarly pertinent to the present situation, appealing for a higher than national patriotism and demanding "the sacrifice of the unlimited sovereignty of one's own nation for the cause of the unlimited sovereignty of humanity."

The volume taken as a whole is a good example of the service which psychology is able to render to the development of sentiments and the clarification of ideas. It is popular, but in the best sense. It does not altogether avoid technicalities, it appeals to the intelligence, but it deals interestingly with matters in which intelligent people are largely interested. Professor Jastrow wields the pen of a ready writer and the style might be improved by a little pruning. But he is not troubled by paucity of ideas, his discussions are illuminating, broad-minded, temperate, and his conclusions arresting and, if not always acceptable, commendable in the cause of sobriety and common-sense.

H. N. GARDINER

SMITH COLLEGE

Social Process. C. H. COOLEY. New York: Scribner, 1918.
Pp. vi + 430.

The psychological and sociological public have learned to expect a high degree of sanity in all that Professor Cooley produces, and they will not be disappointed in this his latest work. He emphasizes at the outset the organic, balanced view of social reality, as against all forms of "particularism." What this organic view is can perhaps best be stated in Professor Cooley's own words: "A form of particularism that until recently was quite general is one that regards the personal wills of individual men as the originative factor in life from which all else comes. . . . In contrast to particularistic views of this sort we have others which find the originative impulse in external conditions of life, such as climate, soil, flora, and fauna; and regard intellectual and social activities merely as the result of the physiological needs of men seeking gratification under these conditions. A doctrine of the latter character having wide acceptance at the present time is 'economic determinism,' which looks upon the production of wealth and the competition for it as the process of which everything else is the result. . . . To treat the human mind as the primary factor in life, gradually unfolding its innate tendencies under the moulding power of conditions, is no less and no more plausible than to begin with the material. Why should originative tendencies be ascribed to things rather than to mind? I see no warrant in observed fact for giving preference to either" (Chapter V).

From this point of view Professor Cooley discusses personal aspects of the social process, degeneration, social factors in biological survival, group conflict, valuation, and the social functioning of intelligence. Perhaps the most valuable of these is his discussion of the human-nature and institutional factors in social and economic values.

The book is unsystematic, a series of essays rather than a closely reasoned and logically arranged scientific text. But it is stimulating and suggestive in every chapter.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

The New State. Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government. M. P. FOLLETT. New York: Longmans, Green, 1918. Pp. vii + 373.

The Value of Money. B. M. ANDERSON. New York: Macmillan, 1917. Pp. xxviii + 610.

The special social sciences are destined to be rewritten as social psychology develops. These two books indicate that the process has already begun. Miss Follett's book is one of the first to attempt frankly the recasting of political theory upon the basis of the new social psychology. She shows the significance of primary groups, especially the neighborhood group, for political life; and that political reconstruction, if we are to realize democracy, must begin with a revitalization of neighborhood group organization. The book is, however, more than a work in political science. Part I is taken up with a presentation of the results of "group psychology"; and perhaps nowhere else can be found a clearer brief presentation of the modern psychological theory of group behavior. Hence the book is indispensable to all who wish a brief summary of the results of psychological sociology.

Dr. Anderson's book on *The Value of Money* is quite as notable for a section of economic theory as Miss Follett's for political theory. Following Cooley, Dr. Anderson finds that economic values, like all prevalent social values, are essentially creations of the social mind. Upon this basis he proceeds to criticize various economic doctrines concerning the value of money, especially the quantity theory, and then constructs a theory of the financial operations of modern business which seems to accord remarkably well with the facts. Chapters I, XXI, and XXII are of especial value to the social psychologist, though the book in general exhibits a wealth of data which social psychologists would do well to consider.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

Essentials of Social Psychology. E. S. BOGARDUS. Los Angeles: Univ. of S. Calif., 1918. Pp. 159.

Social psychology has at length arrived at the "primer" stage of development. Professor Bogardus has done the science a service by putting some of its main conclusions into simple language and very brief compass, so as to make them accessible practically to everyone. The book is suitable for high schools and perhaps for some college courses where only a few weeks can be given to the subject. It discusses in an elementary way instinct, habit, indi-

vidual consciousness, the social self, language, suggestion, imitation, group psychology, invention, leadership, social control, and social progress. It omits problems of social change except as these are brought under one of the preceding heads. A static rather than a dynamic view of the psychic life of social groups is the result; but this is perhaps unavoidable in a brief elementary text.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

The Mulatto in the United States. E. B. REUTER. Boston: Badger, 1918. Pp. 417.

This is an indispensable book for the study of race psychology. It discusses very fully the result of the intermixture of the Negroes and the whites in the United States and of other races throughout the world, giving a wealth of facts. The result is that it proves up to the hilt the superiority of the mulatto to the Negro, if not to the white. "The chances of the mulatto child developing into a leader of the race," the author finds, "are thirty-four times as great as the chances of a black child." "The assumption that the Negro people in America have produced as many superior individuals of pure Negro blood as superior individuals of mixed blood . . . is unsupported by the slightest basis of fact." The important social and political consequences of this fact are discussed very fully by the author.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

The Educational Theory of Social Progress. C. A. ELLWOOD. *Sci. Mo.*, 1917, 5, 439-450.

This timely paper calls renewed attention to the essential educational nature of social progress. Society has been in the past and remains for the future dependent for its advancement upon the accumulation of knowledge, standards and values, and the imparting of these in order to control habit and character. Upon education, therefore, our main reliance must be placed. "Those who put faith in other means of social progress, such as revolutions, are destined to be grievously disappointed. Revolutions have swept away obstacles to social progress, but they have never succeeded in effecting permanent progress except as they have been preceded or followed by processes of education." If the schools are to form habits and character in the individual in order to fit him to participate efficiently in the social life, they should be thoroughly "socialized," i.e., they should aim at the production of efficient

social units. "The measure of socialization is how far an individual's ideas, habits and character contribute to the increased harmony, efficiency and happiness of mankind as a whole; and an individual development in any other direction than this will surely not profit either the individual or his group permanently." The article closes with a number of practical suggestions for the improvement of our educational institutions.

JAMES H. LEUBA

The Philosophy of Christianity. B. GRAHAM. Columbia, S. C.: R. L. Bryan Co., 1917. Pp. ix + 144.

The Conversion of Hamilton Wheeler. A Novelette of Religion and Love, Introducing Studies in Religious Psychology and Pathology. A Voluntary Contribution to the National Mental Hygiene Movement. P. LOCKE. Bloomington, Illinois: Pandect Pub. Co., 1917. Pp. 285.

The psychology of religion has become sufficiently celebrated of late to become the victim of amateur exploitation. Mr. Graham sets forth as the basis of his system of Christian philosophy, under the caption of "Human Psychology" a strange sort of dialectic, possibly intended to be imitative of Hegel. He reveals no knowledge of modern psychology, as the term is understood by professional psychologists of this generation. He says much of the psychology of Adam, who for him is apparently an historical personage. The pseudonymous author of the second book will win from psychologists approval of his main purpose, the exposure in a popular form of the evils of revivalism. He cites a number of standard authorities (p. 26), but not always intelligently. Criticisms of revivalism that are both scientific and popular are needed; and if this author, who shows some promise as a popular writer, will acquire more thorough training in the science of psychology, he may be able in the future to make contributions that will deserve commendation.

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

